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Introduction
A central question for pension design is how benefits should vary with the age of retirement beyond the earliest eligibility age. 1 For examples of widely varying pension benefits designs in many countries, see Gruber and Wise (1999) . In the U.S., retirement ahead of the Normal Retirement Age (NRA), currently 65 but being raised to 67 by the year 2011, reduces benefits by 5/9 of one percent per month (about 6 percent annually). This is called the 'Actuarial Reduction Factor'. Similarly, benefits increase for retirement beyond the NRA up to age 70. This is called 'Delayed Retirement Credit' (DRC).
Workers vary in many ways -in life expectancy, income levels and in the degree of difficulty in continuing work. A good system needs to have flexibility in retirement ages to accommodate this diversity. (See Diamond (2000) lecture 3). It is often argued that it is desirable that the system be neutral with respect to individual retirement decisions, implying that the incentive design should be 'actuarially fair' on average. That is, the present value of additional contributions due to postponed retirement should equal the expected present discounted value of additional benefits.
The implicit assumption is that neutrality will preserve otherwise optimal individual decisions. We shall argue, however, that under asymmetric information, this is not the case. Certain individual attributes relevant to retirement decisions, such as labor disutility, are not observable by pension suppliers (government or private pension firms) and therefore pension schemes cannot depend on such attributes. Consequently, when individuals self-select their optimal retirement age based on their personal characteristics, the ensuing equilibrium is socially suboptimal: benefits to retirees are constrained by the need to provide sufficient incentives to continue work. DRC, by providing an incentive to continue to work, alleviates this constraint and leads to a better allocation of resources. This result holds even when all individuals have the same life expectancy (see Diamond (2000) , lectures 6 -7).
1 Earliest elegibility age (62 in the U.S.) is designed to strike a balance between those who would, in the absence of such threshold, erroneously retire too early and others who have health or other reasons to retire earlier and for whom this imposes a liquidity constraint. One would like to know how this balance changes with increased life expectancy and morbidity. Interestingly, social security reforms in the U.S. and Sweden left the earliest elegibility age intact.
The Model
Consider three different consumption levels: c a for active workers, c We assume that the marginal product of workers is equal and normalize it to one. Thus, the only difference between workers is in the level of labor disutility.
Let T 0 be the age at which individuals have to make a decision whether to take early retirement or postpone retirement to age T 1 , T 1 > T 0 . With a certain life span of T , the length of retirement time is either T − T 0 for early retirees or T − T 1 for delayed retirement.
Normalizing the length of maximum retirement to one, delayed retirement entails work for a period of length α (= T 1 − T 0 T − T 0 ), 0 < α < 1, and retirement for a period of length 1 − α(= T − T 1 T − T 0 ), while early retirement is for a period of one. We further assume a zero subjective discount rate and zero rate of interest.
2
If all those with labor disutility below a certain level, θ 0 , work while the others take early retirement, social welfare, W , is
The budget constraint for the system is
where R are the resources available to the economy.
When c 
First-Best: Labor Disutility Observable
To ensure that the maximization of (1) s.t.(2) entails that some individuals work, we assume that when no one works, those with the least disutility of labor prefer to work for an additional consumption equal to their marginal product:
This condition is called (Diamond-Sheshinski (1995) ) the poverty condition.
When labor disutility is observable, it is possible to determine the optimum consumption levels and the cutoff θ so as to maximize (1) , is allocated to equate marginal utilities of consumption: By (4), this condition becomes:
The First-Best allocation is determined by (4), (5) and the resource constraint (2).
4 Second-Best: Self-Selection Equilibrium
Suppose now that labor disutility is not observable. Consequently, the cutoff θ is determined by individuals: given consumption levels, those with disutility above the level which equates the utility of continued work and delayed retirement to that of early retirement, will prefer working. Thus, the threshold θ, b θ, is determined by:
5
A sufficient condition to make a retirement program socially desirable is that the marginal utility of non-workers exceeds that of workers with the least disutility of work. This condition:
is termed (Diamond-Mirrlees, (1978) ) the moral hazard condition. By (3), there is some work at the optimal allocation. Thus, at least the most able
Maximization of (1) 
where
We have used (6) From (8) and (10) 
Proposition. When the optimum allocation has workers and non-workers, it has a positive delayed retirement credit (DRC) and an implicit tax on work.
Proof.
, we have from (6) and (7) 
The explanation of this result is straightforward. From the moral hazard condition, (6), we know that an attempt to implement the First-Best allocation, (4), is impossible because nobody will work. Any feasible policy that can increase the benefits of retirees without reducing workers' welfare is desirable.
In the absence of DRC, c 7
Now introduce a small DRC, raising retirement benefits for workers by ∆ 1 − α . Since these higher benefits apply for a period of (1 − α), total costs for each worker increase by ∆ and utility increases by v 0 (c 
implying that labor supply increases (by f ( b θ)). 
No Early Retirement
Suppose that θ has a finite upper bound, θ > 0. The 'poverty-condition', (3), ensures that the optimum involves some work. At the other end, suppose that the optimum allocation involves no non-workers, that is, b θ = θ. This means that the consumption of non-workers, b c 0 b , is set at a level (possibly zero) such that nobody chooses early retirement. From (12) it follows that in this case, (10)) and (11) 4 we now obtain the condition, α(b c a − 1) +
Since there are no non-workers to support, there is no 4 Modified (Kuhn-Tucker) conditions for a boundary solution.
8 implicit tax on work 5 .
6 Two-Class Case: Comparative Statics
Consider an economy with two types of individuals: those with labor disutility θ 1 and those with θ 2 (θ 1 < θ 2 ). Population weights of these groups are f 1 and f 2 = 1 − f 1 , respectively. We assume that the optimum has the form that the θ 1 types work while the θ 2 types take early retirement.
Social welfare optimization now takes the form
Condition (17) ensures that individual behavior coincides with that described in the objective function and the resource constraint, (16). The moral hazard condition and (17) imply that Performing the maximization of (15) subject to (16)- (18), we obtain that at the optimum
We can use this example to analyze the effect on the optimal configuration of an increase in longevity, i.e. a decrease in α.
Differentiating (16) and (18) 
db c
From (12) and (18)
By (19) - (20), the effect on the DRC is db c
A sufficient condition for (21) to be positive is that β ≤ 1. This condition The sign of the last expression is unambiguous due to the moral hazard condition.
